Wash 1789 Dispatch No. .... VIA: ..... (Specify air or sea pouch) SECURITY INFORMATION JUL 17 1953 CLASSIFICATION Chief, SE Date .. To DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY Attn:/ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY From SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3020 BGFTEND/PARAM NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT SUBJECT: GENERAL-Security Review of OBSESSION SPECIFIC-**DATE 2007** 

REF: SGAW-1405, 30 June 1953; SGAW-2065, 18 June 1953

## 1. Re para 4 first reference:

- a. AIBABE was first recommended to this office by who, like many of his countrymen. felt that something should be done on the lines explained that AIBABE had on several occasions of the "HTNEIGH Mission." asked to be put in touch with "the friends" who might offer him some employment. AIBABE was interviewed and it was ascertained that he would be willing to undertake any operation which would put him in the Elbasan area. It was explained to AIBARE that HTNEIGH's interests at the present time were in the Pogradec area. If he were willing to undertake this mission, he would certainly be considered for any future mission going in the Elbasan area.
- b. AIBAKU was picked for the mission after reviewing all available persons from the Pogradec area and specifically "Raitse." It was felt that AIBAKU's knowledge of the operational area, his desire to work for HTNEIGH, his proper motivation, and his mutual friendship for AIRABE when added to our information regarding his sense of security gave us just cause for recruiting subject.
- c. It was felt by this office that AIBABE acted as a security check on AIBAKU from the time that the team was formed. (As reported in SGAA-892. KAPOK-945, AIBABE was living in Greece under an assumed name and fear that Greek authorities would be informed placed subject deep under our control and thereby increased our surveillance on AIBAKU).
- d. It may not be known to Headquarters but no operation involving Albanians residing in Greece can be carried out without some knowledge of said operation being made known to either Greek I.S. or A.D. (a) All requests for refugees must be made through the A.D., therefore, our interest in a person immediately becomes known, (b) local traces require that all Greek agencies check their files for information regarding said person, and (c) if a land infiltration is attempted as was the case of OBSESSION, then the team is turned over to the 11959

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Greek I.S. for

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Greek I.S. for assistance in infiltration. However, knowledge about the mission itself is kept from Greek agencies and I believe it was very unlikely that any part of the OBSESSION mission was known by the Greek services.

## 2. 2. Re para 12 first reference:

We find it difficult to say that the security of the BGFIEND safehouse used for OBSESSION was good. The area had been used by BGFIEND since the November 1950 operation knowledge of the area was known to the Greek services, but this was in keeping with local directives requiring us to make this information available to them. We can, however, say that because no one was ever allowed to leave the area unaccompanied that its existence was not common knowledge to the local population.

## 3. Re para 13 first reference:

Compartmentation was maintained throughout the whole planning and staging phases of the operation. The details of the HTNEICH mission were discussed only with the team members. Was aware of the mission as Hqs. requested that our approach to presentation be changed to include HTNEICH member). It can be said that talk concerning this mission even among BGFIEND personnel was limited to those persons having a direct hand in the operation. It is very unlikely that AIRSPRAY gained any information concerning the OBSESSION mission as most Albanians have a great dislike and distrust for their countrymen employed by the Greek I.S. Furthermore, AIRSPRAY is very prone to run off at the mouth, yet no word of OBSESSION Team or its mission reached the local grape—vine. (AIRSPRAY was under the impression that he was being watched by us with an eye toward possible employment. This, however, was done to ensure his close cooperation).

4. We were very pleased with Headquarters' security review of OBSESSION operations and it is our intention to use it as a guide in submitting future reports. We are in complete sympathy with Headquarters and realize that proper evaluation of our operations can not be presented from your side without all the facts being made to you. If Headquarters desires, we will be more than willing to furnish more detailed reports on team operational plans.

13 July 1953 L&C (\*\*) LBR/WFH/1gk

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